

Graeme Kristofer Hefner

It's Everyone's Fault: The Origins of World War One

December 11, 2006

The origins of the First World War have been debated for almost a century. The images of trench warfare, gas attacks, and going over the top drove politicians and historians to place the blame anywhere that would explain the carnage of the war and hopefully not implicate themselves. The lowest common denominator explanation of the causes of the war is the one that is found in primary school textbooks: Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, and the network of European alliances failed to stop the war from occurring.

The simplest of reasons satisfies no one. Since 1918 the goal of most scholarship has been to place the blame on one or more of the principal agents. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, and Britain are all blamed at various points for the outbreak of the war, starting with codification of Germany's guilt in the Treaty of Versailles. Article 231 of the treaty placed responsibility for the war squarely at the feet of the German Empire and its ally Austria-Hungary.<sup>1</sup> Scholarship during the Weimar period focused on either refuting Germany's essential guilt or shifting it onto one or more of the Entente powers.

In the long run they were not successful. The onus of guilt was never truly removed from Germany. Even studies that placed the blame on the Entente powers had to also prove Germany's innocence as part of their argument. After World War Two German historian Fritz Fischer refocused the fractured histories of the interwar period into a thesis that placed all of the responsibility for the war at Germany's door. After this Germany's essential guilt war rarely challenged. Research after Fischer is focused who is guilty in addition to Germany; German responsibility is assumed.

---

<sup>1</sup> John P. McKay, Bennet D. Hill and John Buckler, *A History of Western Society Volume II: From Absolutism to the Present*, 8<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 912-914.

### Early Research and Revision

The Weimar Republic began its official public relations campaign before even ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. In an attempt to clear its name and hopefully remove some of the onus of war guilt the new German government opened the archives of the Imperial Foreign Office under the advisement of Karl Kautsky. This gesture of openness was partly to show how different the new Republic was from the monarchy that had ruled Germany during the war. It also allowed Kautsky to privately publish the first book using these newly released primary sources. His *How the War Originated* placed a Marxist spin on the war. In Kautsky's vision of the war Germany's economic boom was threatened by Britain's economic dominance, causing the militant outlook of the German government and people as they sought to protect their own financial interests.<sup>2</sup>

Although Kautsky published his unofficial book with a Marxist theory, the official compendium of the documents of the Imperial Foreign Office, titled *The German Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the War*, did not have a socialist outlook. Written in conjunction with Walter Schücking and Max Montgelas, the four-volume series also shifted the blame onto members of the Entente. France's aspirations to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine and their military preparations for such, along with Russia's imperial designs for Constantinople, were seen as responsible for the build up to and outbreak of the war.<sup>3</sup> Montgelas went on to publish *The Case for the Central Powers* in 1925, which admitted that Germany made an error in declaring war on Russia so early, but stated that Russia's mobilization of troops made the eventuality of war inevitable.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Frederick A. Hale, "Fritz Fischer and the Historiography of World War One," *The History Teacher* 9, no. 2 (1976): 260-261.

<sup>3</sup> Hale, 261.

<sup>4</sup> Selig Adler, "The War Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918-1928," *The Journal of Modern*

German historians would expand on this even more during the remainder of the Weimar period. Men such as Hanz Herzfeld, Erich Brandenburg, and Gerhard Ritter, many of whom would later become vocal opponents of Fritz Fischer, wrote that Germany had failed to militarize *enough* in the years leading up to 1914. Herzfeld pointed to the failure of the political parties to completely support the military buildup. Brandenburg stated that German foreign policy was too peaceful and anxious.<sup>5</sup>

Germany's interest in clearing her name was so great that a monthly magazine called *Die Kriegsschuldfrage* began publication in 1923. It was open to scholarship from all nations on the question of war-guilt, but maintained a consistent revisionist viewpoint focused on refuting Article 231.<sup>6</sup>

The running theme through all of the Weimar publications was that Germany was essentially innocent. German historians, however, were not alone in shifting the blame onto the other participants in the Great War. During the war historical societies were either silent or were active in supporting the war effort via propaganda. After the arrival of peace all of the Entente powers, and particularly their ally the United States, had revisionist movements that sought to move the blame for the war at least partially onto their own or their allies' shoulders.

Raymond Poincaré, who served as the president of France during the war, was the principal revisionist target in France. Alfred Pevet and Fernand Gouttenoire de Toury claimed that Poincaré had misled and deceived the French people as to the true origins of the war. His reputation became so bad that the former president felt the need to defend

---

*History* 23, no. 1 (1951): 7.

<sup>5</sup> Hale, 261.

<sup>6</sup> Adler, 7.

himself in a series of lectures. Other French historians such as Victor Margueritte and Alfred Fabre-Luce blamed not only the statesmen but also the generals. The consensus of French revisionism is that while the actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary had brought the possibility of the war to the diplomatic tables of Europe, it was the actions of the Entente and France herself that made the war inevitable. Poincaré did not necessarily cause the war, but he had seen it coming and did nothing to stop it.<sup>7</sup>

In Britain the Labour Party campaigned in the early 1920s based on revisionist ideals. They distributed pamphlets that decried the Treaty of Versailles as being too harsh on the Germans and unfairly blaming them for the war. The divided-guilt idea came into popularity in the United Kingdom, with the historian George Peabody Gooch stating that both sides in the conflict had been equally right in their reasoning for going to war, and thus both the Central Powers and the Entente were equally guilty for the outbreak and effects of the conflict. What guilt the British did place on themselves was focused on the actions of Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary during the build-up to the War.<sup>8</sup> Grey would later come into the spotlight again during the 1980s and 1990s.

The most prolific nation producing revisionist literature was the United States. Heavily influenced by the writings of the Entente nations, American historians at first followed the divided-guilt theory established in Britain. Albert Jay Nock was one of the first influential American historians to abandon the theory, instead stating that primary responsibility for the war rested with France and Russia, who were only too prepared and eager to wage war.<sup>9</sup> In this he was echoing the conclusion reached by Kautsky and his

---

<sup>7</sup> Adler, 8, 21-22.

<sup>8</sup> Adler, 9, 22-23.

<sup>9</sup> Adler, 11-12.

German colleagues in their work for the Weimar Republic. Perhaps the most curious of American revisionist literature is that written by a former senator, Robert Latham Owen. The descriptively titled speech *Russian Imperial Conspiracy, 1892-1914*, read in part to the United States Senate, argued that Russia and France had plotted the entire war as an elaborate plot to frame Germany in the eyes of the world, reducing its status as a nation.<sup>10</sup>

The most influential of the American revisionist historians was Harry Elmer Barnes. He started his career in Great War historiography by writing reviews and went on to write his first full article on the subject in 1924, titled “Assessing the Blame for the World War.” At the time Barnes was still closely following the divided-guilt idea for the causes of the war, placing the primary blame with Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France. Barnes found only England less guilty of the war than Germany. A year later he revised his assessment, placing France and Russia most responsible for the war and coming to the conclusion reached by the French revisionists that it was the actions of the Entente that had made the war inevitable.<sup>11</sup> In a speech that angered many, Barnes stated that no honest man could want to receive reparations from Germany as part of Article 231 “any more than he could wish to see an honest man hang.”<sup>12</sup>

Barnes wrote his first book on the subject, *The Genesis of the World War*, in 1926. It evolved his stance even farther. It was the first American book to be written using the primary sources of the governments involved.<sup>13</sup> *The Genesis* shaped the cast of the Entente: Great Britain was the most imperialistic of the pre-war powers, France was the most nationalistic, and France and Russia combined were the most militaristic. The

---

<sup>10</sup> Adler, 14-15.

<sup>11</sup> Adler, 15-17.

<sup>12</sup> “Woman in Clash on French Policy,” *New York Times*, March 15, 1925, 6.

<sup>13</sup> Adler, 17.

war itself was a secret plot by Russia and France begun in 1911, with Germany nothing more than a victim of this scheming.<sup>14</sup>

Having cleared Germany to his standards, Barnes set out to reverse his 1924 stance that had placed a large share of the blame on Austria-Hungary. In 1928 he published *In Quest of Truth and Justice*, which used a new method of placing guilt by examining who had the most to gain from the conflict. Barnes determined that Russia's aggression was the result of a desire for material gain, while Austria-Hungary had acted only to preserve itself. Germany could not be guilty of anything, since it had absolutely nothing to gain by going to war when it did.<sup>15</sup>

The revisionists did not exist in a vacuum. The official stances of the Entente governments and the general beliefs of their people throughout this period still placed the guilt on Germany; only in Weimar was the official position that Germany had acted to defend itself.<sup>16</sup> The driving force behind the influence and penetration of revisionist thought into academic circles was the availability of government documents and primary sources for the Central Powers and Russia during the late 1910s and early 1920s. The new governments in Germany and Austria felt that they could only gain from opening their archives and revealing their side of what had happened. By contrast, England and France did not open their archives until much later, after 1926. The only member of the Entente to reveal their primary documents earlier actually did so before the war was even over. The Russian Revolution led to the publication of documents by the Bolsheviks

---

<sup>14</sup> Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York: H Fertig, 1970). Adler, 17-18.

<sup>15</sup> Adler, 19-20.

<sup>16</sup> Hale.

slanted towards revealing the imperialist goals of the government they had just replaced, effectively blaming their own country for the war, and France by association.<sup>17</sup>

The revisionists did not go un-criticized during their time, either. Many of the reviews of Harry Elmer Barnes' *The Genesis of the World War* are kindest when they say simply "This volume has little to recommend it."<sup>18</sup> Nearly all of the revisionist writers, particularly in America, were criticized for lacking critical thinking skills and their ability to selectively read primary documents. Barnes had a public feud with Edward Raymond Turner, who called Barnes' statement that the war was an Entente plot absurd. Turner placed the blame squarely at the feet of Germany, stating that revisionism was fueled by Germans and communists.<sup>19</sup>

Eckhart Kehr was not the only German historian to challenge the German innocence theory during the Weimar era but he was the most influential. Kehr received his doctorate in 1927 and died early in 1933. He moved the blame back onto Germany by focusing on the mistakes made diplomatically and militarily by the German Empire. His books not only angered conservative German historians, they were also banned by the Third Reich.<sup>20</sup>

The coming of the political crises of the 1930s and the Second World War stifled interest in researching the First until after Germany was defeated for the second time. When research into the Great War began again in earnest, the direction of scholarship

---

<sup>17</sup> Adler, 2-6.

<sup>18</sup> H. A. Wyndham, "The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt." *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 5, no. 6 (1926): 306.

<sup>19</sup> Adler, 18-19.

<sup>20</sup> Hale, 262-263.

would be reversed from that experienced earlier. A German named Fritz Fischer would follow in Kehr's early footsteps and place the blame squarely on Germany.

### **Fritz Fischer and German Guilt**

Fritz Fischer began to change the historiography of the First World War in 1959 when he published an article based on primary documents that he claimed proved that the Great War was started because of Germany's striving for world power, or *Weltmacht*. Fischer also expressed his new theory of continuity, which said that there was a consistent bent to German foreign policy that proved the desire for world power. Previous theories had focused on the actions of a few individuals such as Bethmann-Hollweg, Poincaré, or Grey. Fischer's continuity theory removed the focus on the individuals and instead attempted to show that there was a consistent move towards world power in the German political system as a whole.<sup>21</sup>

The follow-up to Fischer's initial article was the massive *Griff nach der Weltmacht* released in 1961 and nearly 1,000 pages long. The English edition has the title *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. In the book Fischer expands his argument in every conceivable direction to attempt to prove conclusively that Germany was at fault for the War.<sup>22</sup>

The citizens themselves are the first to be examined. Fischer's earliest writings on the continuity theory stated only that there was a consistent desire within Germany's political system for world power. *Griff* expands this further, using evidence to show that there was also a consistent imperial desire in Wilhelmine Germany among the citizenry.

---

<sup>21</sup> Hale, 266-267.

<sup>22</sup> Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W W Norton, 1967).

Industrialists, professors and entrepreneurs pushed German public opinion toward a greater empire in an attempt to create what they believed would be a new era of Mercantilism.

The German navy is also put in the spotlight for pushing for an expanded imperial presence. The industrialists and the navy saw eye to eye, as the massive expansion of the navy under Tirpitz meant that more overseas stations devoted to coaling and repairing the ships were required.<sup>23</sup> The German policy of expanding the navy thus not only antagonized Britain directly, shoving it into the arms of its old enemy France,<sup>24</sup> it also played into the general atmosphere of expansion in Germany.

Overseas empire was not all that Germany wanted according to Fischer. There was also a strong drive towards the concept of a “Middle Europe” (Mitteleuropa) that the Germans could control. This would be an economic empire, not a military or political one. German businesses funded projects in Austria, Romania, and elsewhere; especially famous is the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway project. Where the navy supported the idea of an expanded overseas empire, the military stepped in to support the concept of an economic one uniting Europe. The fear of a two-front war against France and Russia, and the belief that such an outcome was eventually inevitable, drove the German government and military to focus on gaining allies in south-east Europe that provided a buffer between themselves and potentially hostile Russia. Germany repeatedly offered loans and other aid to countries in the region, but was blocked by Russia, Britain, and France.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup> Hale, 267-268.

<sup>24</sup> David Fromkin, *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?* (New York: Knopf, 2004): 60-62.

<sup>25</sup> Hale, 267-269.

The most damning charge is that Germany pushed Austria-Hungary into the war against Serbia, the proximate cause for the Great War itself. Fischer's book goes against the conventional historiography that it was the rashness of the Dual Monarchy in dealing with the Serbian problem that led to the conflict. Instead, Fischer argues that the leadership of Austria-Hungary was initially cautious. Those in the Austrian military that welcomed the assassination as an excuse to settle the Serbian issue once and for all did so with the caveat that they could not move without expressed German support. Germany was unwilling to provide this at first, but soon started to pressure Vienna into declaring war. According to Fischer, it was at Germany's insistence that the ultimatum presented to Serbia be written in language that would be impossible to accept.<sup>26</sup>

The last question to answer is why Germany would want the war. The revisionists of the 1920s argued the innocence of Germany based partially on the fact that it appeared to have nothing to gain from the war. It was a time of great prosperity for the nation and the standard of living was high. Fischer's answer is that they were willing to break the peace because they saw an opportunity to divide the Entente. Germany attempted to isolate Russia in the conflict and hoped that a localized battle over Serbia would be so minute that France and Great Britain would stay out of it. It was a gamble.<sup>27</sup>

*Griff nach der Weltmacht* was not unchallenged. Conservative historians, many writing since the Weimar era, took issue with Fischer's book immediately. Gerhard Ritter was the most vocal of the critics, and claimed that Fischer had quoted German politicians out of context and did not provide enough evidence to truly support his central thesis.

Ritter also took issue with the continuity thesis, admitting that while some in the German

---

<sup>26</sup> Hale, 269-270.

<sup>27</sup> Hale, 270-271.

military were avowed expansionists, the majority wanted peace. The majority of the reaction to Fischer's work was positive, however, and it was generally well received in academia. The initial outrage of the German historical community quickly died down. So influential was the work that the German Democratic Republic even appropriated sections of it to use in promoting a Marxist theory of the war stating that German capitalist economic interests had caused the conflict.<sup>28</sup>

### **Post-Fischer to the Present**

The Fischer thesis stated that Germany's actions made the war inevitable. Scholarship following the publication of *Griff nach der Weltmacht* has tended to directly support the Fischer thesis or to add to it. Some historians reached back to the revisionists of the 1920s in an attempt to dispute either Germany's guilt or the continuity thesis; nothing is done without referencing Fischer, however.

Hans-Ulrich Wehler, although not focusing on the Great War itself, supported Fischer's continuity thesis in several essays. Unabashedly Marxist and a proponent of the *Sonderweg*, Wehler looked to *Innenpolitik*, the focus on the tensions within Germany rather than external foreign politics, to explain the actions of Germany during several critical points in its history. *Innenpolitik* harked back to Eckhart Kehr, and was also one of the foundations for Fischer's continuity thesis. Wehler argued that the forced preeminence of traditional elites required a reliance on military power. Several of his

---

<sup>28</sup> Hale, 271-274.

essays focused on the continuities of German politics and actions, including the first ideals of total war and genocide present in the Herero uprising in Africa.<sup>29</sup>

Another German historian, Andreas Hillgruber, attempted to refute Fischer's findings on both the continuity thesis and Germany's role in starting the Great War. In *Germany and the Two World Wars* he takes a stance similar to the divided-guilt thesis that appeared in the early 1920s. Hillgruber argued that Germany had a "moderate" share of responsibility for starting the war in 1914, but does not attempt to provide any answers as to who shared the rest of the responsibility. In refuting the continuity thesis Hillgruber takes a muddled position; he rejects Fischer's idea that there is a continuity of German imperialist actions by stating that there were some continuities, but also some departures.<sup>30</sup>

The American response to Fischer was also supportive. Paul Kennedy's essay collection *The War Plans of the Great Powers*, published in 1979, compiles essays by multiple authors that closely follow Fischer's findings on Germany's guilt. In fact, Fischer wrote an introduction for the book.<sup>31</sup>

In the 1980s scholarship on the war, while still referencing Fischer, shifted again towards a divided-guilt thesis. James Joll's *The Origins of the First World War*, designed to be an overview of the scholarship on the subject and written as part of a series of books

---

<sup>29</sup> Robert M. Berdahl, "Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte," *The Journal of Modern History* 44, no. 2. (1972): 276-278. W. M. Simon, "Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte," *The English Historical Review* 87, no. 344 (1972): 646-647.

<sup>30</sup> Gerard Braunthal, "Germany and the Two World Wars; Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 2 (1982): 365-366.

<sup>31</sup> Paul Kennedy ed., *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1979.)

on the origins of major wars, takes this middle route. Joll's slight refutation on parts of the Fischer thesis is that the motives of the governmental and military leaders of Germany and other nations were far less rational than has been implied.<sup>32</sup> Joll's conclusion is that the war was started by the breakdown of diplomacy, but not a breakdown that is somehow unique to that era. Deterrents cannot work as a diplomatic method forever; firmness in diplomacy is also not a panacea, as it too can fail with unintended consequences. The war resulted because the desires of the nations involved did not match.<sup>33</sup>

Niall Ferguson's *The Pity of War*, published in 1999, at first appears to completely abandon the Fischer thesis; he places the blame almost entirely upon Great Britain. Germany certainly started a war, but Britain made it a World War. Foreign Secretary Edward Grey takes the majority of the punishment. In Ferguson's vision, Britain forms the coalition of France and Russia against Germany to appease the United States, the only nation that Britain saw as threatening to its power. By contrast to the United States, Ferguson paints Germany as a country with only moderate colonial ambitions and with a navy that could not threaten Britain.<sup>34</sup> Seeing no benefit to Britain in getting involved in the war, Ferguson argues that Grey maneuvered Britain into a war she should have, and could have, avoided.<sup>35</sup> Going a step further, Ferguson actually argues that from an economic standpoint Britain might have benefited from the war, since

---

<sup>32</sup> Keith Robbins, "The Origins of the First World War," *The English Historical Review* 102, no. 403 (1987): 529-530.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Balfour, "The Origins of the First World War," *International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (1984): 152-153.

<sup>34</sup> Holger H. Herwig, "The Pity of War," *The Journal of Modern History* 72, no. 3 (2000): 773.

<sup>35</sup> Samuel R. Williamson, "The Pity of War: Explaining World War I," *The Journal of Military History* 63, no. 4 (1999): 997. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, "Review Article: The First World War," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 324.

a German conquest of the continent would have been benign. In fact, again according to Ferguson, the only effect of this conquest would be to create the current German-dominated European Union 80 years earlier. This would have avoided Britain's economic collapse and Russia never would have become communist.<sup>36</sup>

The criticism against Ferguson was immediate and uniform. For example, he completely ignored all evidence that Grey attempted to reach a diplomatic solution and keep Britain out of the war.<sup>37</sup> One reviewer described the book as "History not as it was, but as it should have been. And if it runs up against four decades of research, so much the better."<sup>38</sup>

Most scholarship does not stray from Fischer as radically as Ferguson. David Fromkin's book *Europe's Last Summer*, published in 2004, has taken the Fischer thesis and expanded it. He does not try to reject or change the theory that Germany was responsible for the war, but merely to explain in detail Germany's motives and actions. Fromkin takes the events of the summer of 1914 in chronological order, in some places day by day, and places blame not just on Germany but also in large part on Austria-Hungary, again exonerating the Entente powers. Fromkin states that there were in fact two wars being prepared in 1914: Germany's military leadership was preparing for war against Russia and France, and Austria-Hungary was looking forward to a war that would punish Serbia.

These wars were long planned according to Fromkin. Vienna and the head of the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Office Leopold Berchtold had started plans for a war against

---

<sup>36</sup> Prior, 323.

<sup>37</sup> Prior, 324.

<sup>38</sup> Herwig, 775.

Serbia in the aftermath of the Second Balkan War and had drafted a preliminary plan on how the war was to be waged two weeks before Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo.<sup>39</sup> The German military, particularly Helmuth von Moltke the younger, were convinced that their country was getting weaker, not stronger, and if they wanted to keep their position in world politics they would have to declare war on the Entente while they could still win it, which meant soon.<sup>40</sup>

Both Austria-Hungary and Germany thus used each other. Austria-Hungary manipulated Germany into supporting the war it wanted against Serbia. Germany pushed Austria-Hungary into the war against Serbia in order to get Russia to mobilize and start the war that the German military wanted against the Entente powers. Only when the fact that there were two separate wars is taken into account do the actions of the German general staff make sense, according to Fromkin.<sup>41</sup>

Fromkin also explores the factors that could have led to peace. Grey is exonerated here, as is Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had a short temper but attempted to get Austria-Hungary to agree to a limited war in order to stop a war from forming with Russia. Had this been obeyed the global conflict might have been stopped. Instead, the German government sent a telegram to Austria-Hungary telling them to ignore this order.<sup>42</sup>

### **Conclusions**

To historians there has always been more to the outbreak of the First World War than the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. All five of the major European powers that

---

<sup>39</sup> Fromkin, 153-161, 260.

<sup>40</sup> Fromkin, 54-63.

<sup>41</sup> Fromkin, 274.

<sup>42</sup> Fromkin, 283-284.

participated in the war were blamed by scholars at one point or another for the conflict. Germany has suffered the worst, starting with the Treaty of Versailles. The divided-guilt theories that seek to hold a middle ground are naturally attractive to generations completely removed from the fighting and the politics surrounding it.

While the majority of scholarship has always tended to place a large portion of the blame on Germany, alternate theories were common and even accepted in scholarly circles before the outbreak of the Second World War. The dissenting voices of historians such as Kehr were drowned out by Weimar's official stance and revisionist historians such as Harry Elmer Barnes.

In this regard Fritz Fischer is the most important figure in the historiography of the origins of the Great War. After his *Griff nach der Weltmacht* no alternative theory has been accepted. Fischer's theories have been expanded on and modified, but they have never been displaced. Even the divided-guilt theories formed after Fischer are framed around his theory; they attempt to show that other countries shared responsibility *in addition to* Germany. It is no longer debated that Germany had little to no role in bringing about the war. It is only debated who else, if anyone, helped Germany in bringing it about.

Bibliography

- Adler, Selig. "The War Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918-1928." *The Journal of Modern History* 23, no. 1 (1951): 1-28.
- Balfour, Michael. "The Origins of the First World War." *International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (1984): 152-153.
- Barnes, Harry Elmer. *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt*. New York: H. Fertig, 1970.
- Berdahl, Robert M. "Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte." *The Journal of Modern History* 44, no 2. (1972): 276-278.
- Blakeley, Brian L. and Jacquelin Collins, eds. *Documents in British History Volume II: 1688 to the Present*. Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993.
- Braunthal, Gerard. "Germany and the Two World Wars; Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics." *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 2 (1982): 365-366.
- Ferguson, Niall. *The Pity of War*. London: Penguin, 1998.
- Fischer, Fritz. *Germany's Aims in the First World War*. New York: W W Norton, 1967.
- Fromkin, David. *Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?* New York: Knopf, 2004.
- Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

- Giddens, Anthony, Michael Mann and Immanuel Wallerstein. "Comments of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*." *The British Journal of Sociology* 40, no. 2 (1989): 328-340.
- Hale, Frederick A. "Fritz Fischer and the Historiography of World War One." *The History Teacher* 9, no. 2 (1976): 258-279.
- Hill, Leonidas E. "The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914." *Military Affairs* 44, no. 4 (1980): 210-211.
- Herwig, Holger H. "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self Censorship in Germany after the Great War." *International Security* 12, no. 2 (1987): 5-44.
- Herwig, Holger H. "The Pity of War." *The Journal of Modern History* 72, no. 3 (2000): 773-775.
- Hillgruber, Andreas. *Germany and the Two World Wars*. Translated by William C. Kirby. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- James, Harold. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000." *Political Science Quarterly* 103, no. 3 (1988): 549-550.
- Kennedy, Paul, ed. *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*. Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1979.
- McKay, John P, Bennett D. Hill and John Buckler. *A History of Western Society Volume II: From Absolutism to the Present*, 8<sup>th</sup> ed. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.
- New York Times*, March 15, 1925.
- Prior, Robin and Trevor Wilson. "Review Article: The First World War." *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 319-328.

- Robbins, Keith. "The Origins of the First World War." *The English Historical Review* 102, no. 403 (1987): 529-530.
- Roberts, Clayton, David Roberts and Douglas R. Bisson. *A History of England Volume II: 1688 to the Present*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002.
- Rose, Norman. *Churchill: The Unruly Giant*. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
- Simon, W. M. "Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871-1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte." *The English Historical Review* 87, no. 344 (1972): 646-647.
- Williamson, Samuel R. "The Pity of War: Explaining World War I." *The Journal of Military History* 63, no. 4 (1999): 996-997.
- Wyndham, H. A. "The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt." *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 5, no. 6 (1926): 306-307.